Working Paper: NBER ID: w17752
Authors: Roland G. Fryer Jr.; Tanaya Devi; Richard T. Holden
Abstract: This paper describes randomized field experiments in eighty-four urban public schools in two cities designed to understand the impact of aligned incentives on student achievement. In Washington DC, incentives were “horizontal” – provided to one agent (students) for various inputs in the education production function (i.e. attendance, behavior, interim assessments, homework, and uniforms). In Houston, TX, incentives were “vertical” – provided to multiple agents (parents, teachers, and students) for a single input (math objectives). On outcomes for which we provided direct incentives, there were large and statistically significant effects from both treatments. Horizontal incentives led to increases in math and reading test scores. Vertical incentives increased math achievement, but resulted in decreased reading, science, and social studies test scores. We argue that the data is consistent with agents perceiving academic achievement in various subjects as substitutes, not complements, in education production.
Keywords: incentives; education; randomized trials; student achievement
JEL Codes: I20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| students learning about their own abilities (G53) | observed effects on academic achievement (I24) |
| horizontal incentives provided to students in Washington D.C. (I24) | significant increase in math test scores (C12) |
| horizontal incentives provided to students in Washington D.C. (I24) | significant increase in reading test scores (I24) |
| vertical incentives in Houston (R38) | increase in math achievement (I24) |
| vertical incentives in Houston (R38) | decrease in reading scores (I24) |
| vertical incentives in Houston (R38) | decrease in science scores (I21) |
| vertical incentives in Houston (R38) | decrease in social studies scores (I24) |