Working Paper: NBER ID: w17634
Authors: Pablo Querubin; James M. Snyder Jr.
Abstract: We employ a regression discontinuity design based on close elections to estimate the rents from a seat in the U.S. congress between 1850-1880. Using census data, we compare wealth accumulation among those who won or lost their first race by a small margin. We find evidence of significant returns for the first half of the 1860s, during the Civil War, but not for other periods. We hypothesize that increased opportunities from the sudden spike in government spending during the war and the decrease in control by the media and other monitors might have made it easier for incumbent congressmen to collect rents.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased government spending during the civil war (H56) | Opportunities for rent extraction (D43) |
| Decreased oversight from the media and voters (D72) | Greater rent-seeking behavior during the civil war (H56) |
| Wealth accumulation for congressmen from states heavily involved in military contracting during the war (H56) | Financial gains influenced by committee assignments (D72) |
| Serving in Congress during the civil war years (1861-1866) (N41) | Significant wealth accumulation for congressmen who won their elections by narrow margins (D72) |