Working Paper: NBER ID: w17436
Authors: Matthew Gentzkow; Emir Kamenica
Abstract: We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.
Keywords: competition; information revelation; Blackwell-connectedness
JEL Codes: D83; L15; M37
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| competition (L13) | information revelation (D82) |
| Blackwell-connectedness (R13) | information revelation (D82) |
| number of senders (C39) | information revelation (D82) |
| alignment of sender preferences (C78) | information revelation (D82) |
| information environment (D83) | information revelation (D82) |
| collusion (D74) | information revelation (D82) |