Working Paper: NBER ID: w17411
Authors: Frederico Finan; Laura A. Schechter
Abstract: While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H23; H41; O1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| reciprocity (Z13) | vote-buying (D72) |
| 1 standard deviation increase in reciprocity (C21) | higher likelihood of vote-buying (D72) |
| 1 standard deviation increase in reciprocity (C21) | likelihood of experiencing vote-buying (D72) |
| reciprocal individuals (D16) | more likely to reciprocate vote-buying transfers (D72) |