Working Paper: NBER ID: w17398
Authors: Benjamin A. Olken; Rohini Pande
Abstract: Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists' ability to measure corruption. This, in turn, has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption. We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory, but also that effects of anti-corruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents.
Keywords: Corruption; Developing Countries; Economic Incentives
JEL Codes: D73; H83; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| corruption adapts to policy changes (D73) | effectiveness of anticorruption strategies (H57) |
| economic incentives (M52) | corruption levels (H57) |
| corruption levels (H57) | business activity (M21) |
| anticorruption policies (H57) | corruption (D73) |
| anticorruption policies (H57) | efficiency costs of corruption (H57) |
| corruption (D73) | economic outcomes (F61) |