Working Paper: NBER ID: w17340
Authors: Soohyung Lee; Muriel Niederle; Hyerim Kim; Wookeum Kim
Abstract: The large literature on costly signaling and the somewhat scant literature on preference signaling had varying success in showing the effectiveness of signals. We use a field experiment to show that even when everyone can send a signal, signals are free and the only costs are opportunity costs, sending a signal increases the chances of success. In an online dating experiment, participants can attach "virtual roses" to a proposal to signal special interest in another participant. We find that attaching a rose to an offer substantially increases the chance of acceptance. This effect is driven by an increase in the acceptance rate when the offer is made to a participant who is less desirable than the proposer. Furthermore, participants endowed with more roses have more of their offers accepted than their counterparts.
Keywords: signaling; online dating; preference signaling; field experiment
JEL Codes: C78; C93; J0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| sending a rose (Y60) | likelihood of proposal acceptance (C52) |
| sending a rose (Y60) | success rates of proposals (C52) |
| more roses (Y70) | likelihood of proposal acceptance (C52) |
| roses (Y60) | perceived seriousness of proposals (E71) |
| roses (Y60) | attractiveness of less desirable senders (J79) |
| roses (Y60) | acceptance rates across desirability groups (C52) |