Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives

Working Paper: NBER ID: w17330

Authors: Elias Albagli; Christian Hellwig; Aleh Tsyvinski

Abstract: We study the interplay of share prices and firm decisions when share prices aggregate and convey noisy information about fundamentals to investors and managers. First, we show that the informational feedback between the firm's share price and its investment decisions leads to a systematic premium in the firm's share price relative to expected dividends. Noisy information aggregation leads to excess price volatility, over-valuation of shares in response to good news, and undervaluation in response to bad news. By optimally increasing its exposure to fundamental risks when the market price conveys good news, the firm shifts its dividend risk to the upside, which amplifies the overvaluation and explains the premium. Second, we argue that explicitly linking managerial compensation to share prices gives managers an incentive to manipulate the firm's decisions to their own benefit. The managers take advantage of shareholders by taking excessive investment risks when the market is optimistic, and investing too little when the market is pessimistic. The amplified upside exposure is rewarded by the market through a higher share price, but is inefficient from the perspective of dividend value.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: G10; G12; G30


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
share prices (G12)investment decisions (G11)
investment decisions (G11)share prices (G12)
share prices (G12)systematic premium relative to expected dividends (G35)
informational feedback (D83)systematic premium relative to expected dividends (G35)
linking managerial compensation to share prices (M12)excessive investment risks (G11)
linking managerial compensation to share prices (M12)underinvestment during pessimistic market conditions (G31)
excessive investment risks (G11)higher share prices (G19)
high information friction (D89)reduced correlation between prices and fundamentals (G19)

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