Working Paper: NBER ID: w17324
Authors: Judd B. Kessler; Alvin E. Roth
Abstract: Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C91; C92; D02; D71; I11; I28
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of a donor-priority system (D64) | increase in organ donor registration rates (K16) |
| donor priority (D64) | likelihood of individuals registering as organ donors (D64) |
| priority condition (C69) | registration rates compared to control condition (C90) |
| rebate mimicking priority rule (C78) | registration behavior (K16) |