Working Paper: NBER ID: w17059
Authors: William T. Harbaugh; Naci H. Mocan; Michael S. Visser
Abstract: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.
Keywords: theft; deterrence; economic experiments; penalties; probability of detection
JEL Codes: J00; K14; K40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| amount of money that can be stolen (E42) | probability of stealing (C13) |
| probability of getting caught (K42) | probability of stealing (C13) |
| severity of the penalty (K40) | probability of stealing (C13) |
| certainty of being caught and severity of penalty (K42) | probability of stealing (C13) |
| penalty severity and probability of getting caught (K42) | probability of stealing (C13) |