An Analysis of the Stabilizing and Welfare Effects of Intervention in Spot and Futures Markets

Working Paper: NBER ID: w1698

Authors: Robert B. Campbell; Stephen J. Turnovsky

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of three alternative rules on the long-run distributions of both the spot and futures prices ina single commodity market, in which the key behavioral relationships are derived from the optimizing behavior of producers and speculators.The rules considered include: (i) leaning against the wind in the spot market; (ii) utility maximizing speculative behavior by the stabilization authority in the futures market; (iii) leaning against the wind in the futures market. Since the underlying model is sufficiently complex to preclude analytical solutions, the analysis makes extensive use of simulation methods. As a general proposition we find that intervention in the futures market is not as effective in stabilizing either the spot price of the futures price as is intervention in the spot market. Indeed, Rule (iii), while stabilizing the futures price may actually destabilize the spot price. Furthermore, the analogous type of rule undertaken in the spot market will always stabilize the futures price to a greater degree than it does the spot price. The welfare implications of these rules are also discussed. Our analysis shows how these can generate rather different distributions of welfare gains, including the overall benefits.

Keywords: Commodity Price Stabilization; Market Intervention; Welfare Analysis

JEL Codes: D4; G1; Q1


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
intervention in the futures market (G13)spot price (D41)
intervention in the futures market (G13)futures price (G13)
intervention in the spot market (F31)spot price (D41)
type of disturbance (C62)producers' expected profits (D22)
intervention (D74)distributions of welfare gains (D39)
intervention during demand disturbances (C69)profit stability (L21)
intervention during supply shocks (F41)profit destabilization (D59)

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