Working Paper: NBER ID: w16954
Authors: Geoffrey Heal; Howard Kunreuther
Abstract: Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.
Keywords: climate negotiations; tipping point; greenhouse gas emissions; international cooperation
JEL Codes: C72; F53; Q56
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| adoption of climate policies by a small group of countries (F68) | influence on other countries to adopt similar measures (F68) |
| tipping set (Y20) | broader adoption of climate policies (Q58) |
| costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions decrease as more countries join the agreement (Q52) | increasing net benefits for all participants (D61) |
| first mover's actions (F23) | lower costs for subsequent adopters (D16) |
| actions of influential countries (F53) | behavior of others in the international community (F55) |