Working Paper: NBER ID: w16948
Authors: Monica Martinez-Bravo; Gerard Padro i Miquel; Nancy Qian; Yang Yao
Abstract: We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability.
Keywords: Institutions; Elections; Leader Accountability; Local Democracy; Public Goods
JEL Codes: H4; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Introduction of elections (K16) | Reduction in enforcement of the one-child policy (J13) |
| Introduction of elections (K16) | Decrease in probability of village land being expropriated (H13) |
| Introduction of elections (K16) | Increased public goods investment (H40) |
| Increased public goods investment (H40) | Enhanced ability of villagers to monitor VCs (O36) |
| Introduction of elections (K16) | Shift in type I policies towards preferences of villagers (P26) |
| Introduction of elections (K16) | No significant effects on type III policies (G52) |