Working Paper: NBER ID: w16850
Authors: Roland G. Fryer
Abstract: Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find any evidence that the incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The paper concludes with a speculative discussion of theories that may explain these stark results.
Keywords: teacher incentives; student achievement; public schools; New York City
JEL Codes: I20; J00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Teacher incentives (J33) | Student achievement (I24) |
| Teacher incentives (J33) | Student attendance (I21) |
| Teacher incentives (J33) | Graduation rates (I21) |
| Teacher incentives (J33) | Teacher behavior (retention) (M51) |
| Teacher incentives (J33) | Teacher behavior (absenteeism) (J22) |
| Random assignment (C90) | Teacher incentives (J33) |