Working Paper: NBER ID: w16710
Authors: Derek Neal
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the design of incentive schemes in education while reviewing empirical studies that evaluate performance pay programs for educators. Several themes emerge. First, it is difficult to use one assessment system to create both educator performance metrics and measures of student achievement. To mitigate incentives for coaching, incentive systems should employ assessments that vary in both format and item content. Separate no-stakes assessments provide more reliable information about student achievement because they create no incentives for educators to take hidden actions that contaminate student test scores. Second, relative performance schemes are rare in education even though they are more difficult to manipulate than systems built around psychometric or subjective performance standards. Third, assessment-based incentive schemes are mechanisms that complement rather than substitute for systems that promote parental choice, e.g. vouchers and charter schools.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: I20; I28
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| performance pay design (J33) | integrity of student achievement measures (I24) |
| relative performance schemes (J33) | teacher behavior (C92) |
| performance pay schemes (J33) | coaching behaviors (C92) |
| coaching behaviors (C92) | student skill development (J24) |
| performance pay systems (J33) | allocations of teacher effort (A21) |
| allocations of teacher effort (A21) | distortions in educational tasks (I24) |
| high performance standards (L15) | lower effort levels among educators (I24) |