Working Paper: NBER ID: w16645
Authors: Rafael Di Tella; Ricardo Preztruglia
Abstract: In this paper we present the results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient's tokens, take more of them. They were also more likely to report believing that the recipient would accept a low price in exchange for a side payment; and selected larger numbers as their best guess of the likely proportion of recipients acting "unfairly". The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others.
Keywords: beliefs; altruism; dictator game; corruption; economic behavior
JEL Codes: E62; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Opportunity to take more resources (Q20) | Beliefs about recipients' actions (D64) |
| High stakes treatment (I12) | Beliefs about recipients' actions (D64) |
| Capacity to take more (E22) | Negative beliefs about recipients (F35) |
| Beliefs about recipients' actions (D64) | Justification of selfish actions (D64) |
| Taking more resources (Q21) | Alleviation of moral dissonance (D80) |