Working Paper: NBER ID: w16637
Authors: Michael McBride; Gary Richardson
Abstract: Governments fighting terrorists have many tactical options, yet these options often yield unintended and counterproductive consequences. This paper models a terrorist organization, a religious group from which the terrorists recruit suicide bombers, and the society in which the terrorists are embedded. The model illuminates how the choice of anti-insurgent tactics influences the incidence of attacks, paying particular attention to the direct and indirect (unintended) consequences of the government's actions. The ultimate goal of this work is to identify the best way to stop terrorist attacks
Keywords: terrorism; suicide attacks; counterterrorism; game theory; unintended consequences
JEL Codes: D02; D85; Z12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| government tactics (H56) | incidence of suicide attacks (H56) |
| direct action tactics (B51) | recruitment of militants (H56) |
| direct action tactics (B51) | incidence of suicide attacks (H56) |
| attrition tactics (L21) | time required for training recruits (M53) |
| time required for training recruits (M53) | frequency of suicide bombings (F51) |
| government tactics (H56) | recruitment and training of suicide bombers (M53) |