Working Paper: NBER ID: w16635
Authors: Alain de Janvry; Frederico Finan; Elisabeth Sadoulet
Abstract: This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.
Keywords: electoral incentives; conditional cash transfer; school dropout; Brazil; local governance
JEL Codes: D78; H43; I28; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral incentives (D72) | Bolsa Escola program performance (I24) |
| Bolsa Escola program performance (I24) | School dropout rates (I21) |
| First-term mayors (H70) | Bolsa Escola program performance (I24) |
| First-term mayors (H70) | Probability of reelection (D79) |
| Public denouncements of inclusion errors (J79) | Probability of reelection (D79) |