Working Paper: NBER ID: w16558
Authors: Randall Morck
Abstract: The federal government stands poised to exercise its constitutional right to regulate financial markets, an area traditionally left to competing provincial securities commissions. The current state of securities regulation renders impotent US-style takeover defences, such as poison pills and staggered boards, but allows voting caps and pyramiding in their stead. Various federal securities regulation models are weighted in light of the current state of their needed complementary institutions. One option, for which Canada is relatively well prepared, is the British model of activist independent institutional investors and mandatory takeover bids.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: G23; G3; G38; K22; N22; P5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| shareholder democracy (G34) | firm performance (L25) |
| shareholder democracy (G34) | economic performance (P17) |
| accountability of corporate insiders (G34) | firm performance (L25) |
| lack of shareholder democracy (G34) | underperformance (D29) |
| controlling shareholders and dual-class shares (G34) | shareholder democracy (G34) |
| shareholder democracy (G34) | corporate governance (G38) |
| corporate governance (G38) | economic performance (P17) |
| improved democratic practices (D72) | shareholder wealth (G34) |
| improved democratic practices (D72) | job creation (J68) |