Working Paper: NBER ID: w16530
Authors: B. Douglas Bernheim; Navin Kartik
Abstract: We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems. Potential candidates differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit (altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suffered when selling out to special interests after securing office). Both aspects combine to determine an individual's quality as governor. We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools for arbitrary costs of running for office, including the case where those costs become vanishingly small. We explore how policy instruments such as the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection. We also show that self-selection can have surprising implications for the effect of information disclosures concerning candidates' backgrounds.
Keywords: candidate self-selection; public spirit; honesty; governance quality; anticorruption enforcement
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public spirit (D64) | likelihood of entering political arena (D72) |
| honesty (Z13) | likelihood of entering political arena (D72) |
| governor's compensation (J33) | governance quality (H11) |
| anticorruption enforcement (K42) | governance quality (H11) |
| information disclosures (G38) | voter choice (D72) |