Working Paper: NBER ID: w16339
Authors: Robert T. Deacon; Dominic P. Parker; Christopher Costello
Abstract: We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.
Keywords: common pool resources; fisheries management; voluntary cooperation; Pareto improvements
JEL Codes: Q22; D23; L23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| cooperative management (P13) | fishing efficiency (Q22) |
| cooperative management (P13) | profitability (L21) |
| cooperative structure (P13) | consolidation of fishing effort (Q22) |
| cooperative management practices (J54) | number of vessels required (L92) |
| cooperative management (P13) | enhanced efficiency (D61) |
| cooperative's ability to share information (P13) | rent gains for cooperative members (P13) |
| legal challenges faced by the cooperative (P13) | eventual collapse (G33) |
| cooperative structure (P13) | Pareto improvements (D61) |
| operational decisions (C44) | improved fishing practices (Q22) |
| operational decisions (C44) | economic benefits (D61) |