Working Paper: NBER ID: w16184
Authors: Roberton C. Williams III
Abstract: In recent years, cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common, even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states. This paper argues that this change arose at least in part because of a shift in the type of regulation used at the federal level, from command-and-control regulation toward more incentive-based regulation. Under an incentive-based federal regulation, a state imposing a tighter regulation will bear only part of the additional cost, and thus has more incentive to tighten regulation than it does under federal command-and-control. This difference helps to explain observed patterns of regulation. In addition, it has implications for the choice of regulatory instruments. For a pollutant that causes both local and spillover damage, a federal pollution tax is likely to yield a more efficient outcome than federal command-and-control policy or a federal system of tradable permits.
Keywords: Environmental Policy; Federalism; Market-Based Regulation
JEL Codes: D62; H23; H77; Q58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| federal regulatory frameworks (L98) | state-level overrides of federal environmental regulations (Q58) |
| shift from command-and-control regulation to incentive-based regulation (G18) | increased likelihood of stricter state regulations (K23) |
| incentive-based regulations (G18) | states impose stricter regulations (K23) |
| command-and-control regulation (L51) | states bear full cost of tighter regulations (H76) |
| incentive-based regulations (G18) | states incur part of additional costs (H79) |
| federal pollution tax (Q58) | more efficient regulatory outcome (G18) |