Working Paper: NBER ID: w16009
Authors: Isaac Ehrlich; Tetsuya Saito
Abstract: The interaction between offenders and potential victims has so far received relatively little attention in the literature on the economics of crime. The main objective of this paper is twofold: to extend the "market for offenses model" to deal with both "product" and "factor" markets, and to apply it to the case where guns are used for crime commission by offenders and for self-protection by potential victims. Our analysis offers new insights about the association between crime and guns and the limits it imposes on the efficacy of law enforcement and regulatory policies aimed to control both crime and guns.
Keywords: Economics of Crime; Guns; Law Enforcement; Regulatory Policies
JEL Codes: C72; D78; H49; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Stricter law enforcement (K42) | Decrease in crime rate (K00) |
| Stricter law enforcement (K42) | Decrease in total gun holding (H56) |
| Higher expected penalties (K49) | Decrease in incidence of crime (q) (K42) |
| Higher expected penalties (K49) | Decrease in demand for guns by offenders and potential victims (K42) |
| Gun regulations (K16) | Ambiguous effects on crime rates and gun holding (K00) |
| Increase in price of guns (H56) | Decrease in demand for guns by potential victims (H56) |
| Decrease in demand for guns by potential victims (H56) | Higher likelihood of victimization (K42) |
| Higher likelihood of victimization (K42) | Affecting self-protection strategies (D91) |
| Interplay between offenders' and victims' gun holding (K42) | Overall crime rate (K42) |