Working Paper: NBER ID: w15913
Authors: Gary Charness; Peter J. Kuhn
Abstract: This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, union-firm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C9; J0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| laboratory experiments (C91) | confirm predictions derived from traditional principal-agent theory (D82) |
| wage generosity (J31) | effort levels (D29) |
| social preferences (D71) | influence behaviors (C92) |
| incentives (M52) | workers' effort levels (J29) |
| gift exchange (D64) | complex relationship between wages and effort (J31) |