Working Paper: NBER ID: w15865
Authors: Lee J. Alston; Gary D. Libecap; Bernardo Mueller
Abstract: We extend the literature on interest group behavior and policy outcomes by examining how groups with limited resources (votes and campaign contributions) effectively influence government by manipulating media information to voters. Voters in turn lobby politicians to implement the group's preferred policies. In this manner interest groups can secure favorable government actions beyond their size and wealth. This is an important contribution because of the increased role of the media in the information age and because this linkage better explains observed government policies. We develop a multi-principal, multi-task model of interest group behavior and generate the characteristics of interest groups that would be most successful using publicity to secure their policy objectives. We apply the model to the Landless Peasants' Movement in Brazil. We detail how the Landless Peasants' Movement molds information; show the general voter response; and examine the reaction of politicians in changing the timing and nature of policy.
Keywords: Interest Groups; Media Manipulation; Public Policy; Landless Peasants Movement; Brazil
JEL Codes: D23; D72; D78; O13; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| MST actions (C69) | government efforts in land reform (Q15) |
| MST media coverage (C87) | voter lobbying for land reform policies (D72) |
| MST media strategies (M30) | voter awareness of land reform issues (K16) |
| MST actions (C69) | political pressure on government (D72) |
| MST actions (C69) | government expenditures on land reform (Q15) |
| media portrayal of MST (H84) | presidential popularity (D72) |
| negative public sentiment towards government (H12) | presidential approval ratings (D79) |
| MST media presence (C87) | voter perceptions (K16) |
| voter perceptions (K16) | government action towards land reform (P26) |