Working Paper: NBER ID: w15667
Authors: Daniel Treisman
Abstract: Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called "resource curse"--the argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia--a country with an industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority private-owned--is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource dependence.
Keywords: Oil; Democracy; Russia; Resource Curse
JEL Codes: H1; H3; N54
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Oil income (L71) | Democratic governance (D72) |
| Russia would likely be more democratic if it had no oil or gas (P28) | Democratic governance (D72) |
| Fluctuations in oil revenue (Q33) | Changes in Russia's polity score (P26) |
| Oil wealth (L71) | Authoritarianism (D70) |
| Privatization of the oil sector (L33) | Impact of oil income on democratic governance (D72) |
| Existing industrialization level (L69) | Impact of oil income on democratic governance (D72) |