Can We Infer Social Preferences from Lab Evidence from the Trust Game

Working Paper: NBER ID: w15654

Authors: Nicole M. Baran; Paola Sapienza; Luigi Zingales

Abstract: We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

Keywords: social preferences; trust game; reciprocity; alumni donations

JEL Codes: C9; D64; H41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
reciprocity measure from the trust game (C71)real-world donation behavior (D64)
fraction of the amount returned by the responder in the trust game (C71)amount donated to the university (D64)
lab measures (C91)real-world behavior (C91)
donation amount (D64)social pressure (C92)
demographic controls (J11)causal claims (C22)

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