Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Working Paper: NBER ID: w15598

Authors: Petra Moser; Alessandra Voena

Abstract: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Keywords: compulsory licensing; domestic invention; Trading with the Enemy Act; patents

JEL Codes: N32; N42; O1; O12; O2; O3; O31; O34; O38


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Compulsory licensing under the TWEA (D45)Domestic invention in the U.S. (N62)
Each additional license granted (D45)Domestic patents (O34)
Novelty of licensed patents (O34)Domestic invention (O39)
Compulsory licensing under the TWEA (D45)Increase in patent applications over time (O38)

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