Working Paper: NBER ID: w15560
Authors: Enrico Spolaore
Abstract: This paper reviews the economics approach to conflict and national borders. The paper provides a summary of ideas and concepts from the economics literature on the size of nations; illustrates them within an analytical framework where populations engage in conflict over borders and resources, and may form non-aggression pacts, military alliances, and political unions; and discusses extensions and directions for further research.
Keywords: National borders; Conflict; Peace; Economics of conflict; Political unions
JEL Codes: D74; F51; F59; H56
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| military power (H56) | national size (F52) |
| importance of international conflict (F51) | national size (F52) |
| reduction in importance of international conflict (F51) | incentives to form larger political unions (F55) |
| perceived external threats (F52) | political structure (H11) |
| democratization (D72) | secessions (H77) |
| democratization (D72) | formation of smaller countries (F55) |