How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis

Working Paper: NBER ID: w15542

Authors: Arvind Krishnamurthy

Abstract: This article explains how debt markets have malfunctioned in the crisis, with deleterious consequences for the real economy. I begin with a quick overview of debt markets. I then discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions: risk capital and risk aversion, repo financing and haircuts, and counterparty risk. In each of these areas, feedback effects can arise, so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious spiral. I document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during the crisis. Next, I show how these issues caused debt markets to break down: fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far removed from the "toxic" subprime mortgage assets at the root of the crisis. Finally, I discuss briefly four steps that the Federal Reserve took to ease the crisis, and how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis.

Keywords: debt markets; financial crisis; liquidity; risk capital; repo financing

JEL Codes: E43; E44; E52; G01


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Decline in risk capital among financial institutions (G21)Increased risk aversion (D81)
Increased risk aversion (D81)Reduced willingness to engage in debt market transactions (G19)
Reduced willingness to engage in debt market transactions (G19)Decreased liquidity (G33)
Decreased liquidity (G33)Reduced asset prices (G19)
Reduced asset prices (G19)Additional declines in risk capital (G32)
Rising repo haircuts (E49)Increased counterparty risk (F65)
Increased counterparty risk (F65)Exacerbated liquidity issues in debt markets (F65)
Higher haircuts (F31)Diminished ability to finance trades (G19)
Diminished ability to finance trades (G19)Contraction in market activity (E32)
Rise in perceived risk (D81)Reduction in reliance on repo agreements (E49)
Reduction in reliance on repo agreements (E49)Further impeding liquidity (G33)

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