Working Paper: NBER ID: w15486
Authors: Carol McAusland; Peter J. Kuhn
Abstract: We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights; Brain Drain; International Migration; Knowledge Workers
JEL Codes: F22; J61; O34
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| IPR policy manipulation by governments (L49) | increased protection levels (Y50) |
| as developing countries grow (O10) | stronger IPR protections (O34) |
| significant outflow of skilled labor (F22) | underprotect IPRs (O34) |
| as the South develops (O17) | IPR policies rise to levels similar to those of the North (L49) |
| expatriate brains effect dominates (F22) | potential choice of zero IPR protection in Nash equilibrium (C72) |