Working Paper: NBER ID: w15445
Authors: Kyle Bagwell; Robert W. Staiger
Abstract: We consider the purpose and design of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, GATT. We review recent developments in the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. And we describe the GATT/WTO architecture and briefly trace its historical antecedents. We suggest that the existing literature provides a useful framework for understanding and interpreting central features of the design and practice of the GATT/WTO, and we identify key unresolved issues.
Keywords: WTO; GATT; Trade Agreements; Terms of Trade; International Trade
JEL Codes: F02; F13; F55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| trade agreements (F13) | avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies (F14) |
| unilateral policies (F68) | adverse outcomes for initiating government (H53) |
| unilateral policies (F68) | adverse outcomes for trading partners (F10) |
| terms-of-trade manipulation (F14) | trade agreements (F13) |
| trade agreements (F13) | self-enforcing mechanism (P14) |
| self-enforcing mechanism (P14) | mitigates adverse effects (E71) |
| design of trade agreements (F13) | influenced by terms-of-trade externalities (F16) |