Working Paper: NBER ID: w15378
Authors: Daron Acemoglu; Davide Ticchi; Andrea Vindigni
Abstract: A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.
Keywords: Civil Wars; Military Strength; Political Economy; Weak States
JEL Codes: H2; N10; N40; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| military strength (H56) | civil war persistence (D74) |
| small army (H56) | ongoing civil conflict (D74) |
| large army (H56) | risk of military intervention (H56) |
| civilian elites derive significant rents (D33) | maintain small army (H56) |
| threat from rebels (D74) | compel elite to build larger army (H56) |
| strong military (H56) | defeat insurgents (H56) |
| strong military (H56) | threat to civilian authority (H56) |
| military size (H56) | probability of civil war resolution (D74) |
| military size (H56) | likelihood of military coups (H56) |