Working Paper: NBER ID: w15212
Authors: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; René M. Stulz
Abstract: We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentives and share ownership before the crisis and whether CEOs reduced their equity stakes in their banks in anticipation of the crisis. There is no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed better during the crisis and some evidence that these banks actually performed worse both in terms of stock returns and in terms of accounting return on equity. Further, option compensation did not have an adverse impact on bank performance during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis; further, there is no evidence that they hedged their equity exposure. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses as a result of the crisis.
Keywords: CEO incentives; credit crisis; bank performance; equity ownership
JEL Codes: G01; G21; G32
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| CEO incentives (M12) | bank performance (G21) |
| option compensation (J33) | bank performance (G21) |
| CEO foresight (M12) | shares held (G34) |
| CEO incentives (M12) | CEO foresight (M12) |