Working Paper: NBER ID: w15083
Authors: Raghuram G. Rajan; Rodney Ramcharan
Abstract: We thank Lakshmi Aiyar, Shawn Cole, Stijn Claessens, Oded Galor, Adair Morse, Mark Rosenzweig, Jeremy Stein, as well as participants in seminars at the IMF, the NBER Political Economy, Corporate Finance, and Growth Workshops, M.I.T., Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, the WFA Meetings, and Yale University for comments. Rajan benefited from grants from the Stigler Center for the Study of the State and the Economy, from the Initiative on Global Markets, and from the National Science Foundation. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Keywords: banking; political economy; land distribution; credit access; financial development
JEL Codes: G20; O16; O43
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Land concentration (Q24) | Credit access (G21) |
| Land concentration (Q24) | Cost of credit (G21) |
| Land concentration (Q24) | Limited bank entry (G21) |
| Tenancy levels (R21) | Banking density (G21) |
| Crop lien laws (Q15) | Bank entry (G21) |
| Local constituencies (D79) | Banking development (O16) |
| Land concentration (Q24) | Banking density (G21) |