Working Paper: NBER ID: w15050
Authors: Matthias Doepke; Fabrizio Zilibotti
Abstract: In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby improve children's welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child labor.
Keywords: child labor; international labor standards; political economy
JEL Codes: J20; J88; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| imposition of international labor standards (IS) (J80) | domestic political support for banning child labor (B) (J88) |
| imposition of international labor standards (IS) (J80) | child labor (J82) |
| displacement of child labor from export sector into domestic sector (F66) | competition for unskilled adults (F66) |
| competition for unskilled adults (F66) | domestic political support for banning child labor (B) (J88) |