Working Paper: NBER ID: w15042
Authors: Randall Morck; Bernard Yeung
Abstract: Different economies at different times use different institutional arrangements to constrain the people entrusted with allocating the economy's capital and other resources. Comparative financial histories show these corporate governance regimes to be largely stable through time, but capable of occasional dramatic change in response to a severe crisis. Legal origin, language, culture, religion, accidents of history (path dependence), and other factors affect these changes because they affect how people and societies solve problems.
Keywords: corporate governance; crises; institutional arrangements; comparative analysis
JEL Codes: G01; G34; N2; P1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| legal origins (K15) | corporate governance structures (G38) |
| corporate governance structures (G38) | resource allocation (H61) |
| crises (H12) | shifts in governance models (G38) |
| cultural factors (Z10) | responses to crises (H12) |
| historical factors (B15) | responses to crises (H12) |
| nature of governance (H11) | economic performance (P17) |
| nature of governance (H11) | resource allocation (H61) |
| controlling shareholders' power (G34) | ownership structures (G32) |