Working Paper: NBER ID: w15013
Authors: Assaf Razin; Edith Sand
Abstract: The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favor of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: F22; H55; J11; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| pay-as-you-go social security system (H55) | immigration policy liberalization (K37) |
| pay-as-you-go social security system (H55) | young voters' attitudes towards immigration policy (K37) |
| young voters' attitudes towards immigration policy (K37) | immigration policy liberalization (K37) |
| birth rates of immigrants (J11) | young voters' attitudes towards immigration policy (K37) |
| pay-as-you-go social security system (H55) | birth rates of immigrants (J11) |