Working Paper: NBER ID: w1499
Authors: Robert E. Baldwin
Abstract: The model of rent-seeking presented in this paper is consistent with the observation that labor and management in an industry almost always adopt the same position concerning the desirability of import protection versus trade liberalization. The paper also discusses the size of the returns to rent-seeking relative to the costs of lobbying, factors influencing the type of government assistance sought by an industry, and ways in which the benefits and costs of protection can be made more widely known to both the industries concerned and the general public.
Keywords: rent-seeking; trade policy; import protection; lobbying; economic interests
JEL Codes: F13; F15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| import competition (L13) | lobbying efforts (D72) |
| threat of income loss from imports (F66) | lobbying for protection (K16) |
| expected benefits from protection (D18) | lobbying efforts (D72) |
| fear of job insecurity (J63) | collective lobbying (D70) |
| labor skills, capital returns (J24) | lobbying for protection (K16) |
| import competition (L13) | labor income (J39) |
| labor income (J39) | lobbying efforts (D72) |