Working Paper: NBER ID: w14930
Authors: Andreas Lange; Andreas Löschel; Carsten Vogt; Andreas Ziegler
Abstract: We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show that the perceived support of different equity rules by countries or groups of countries may be explained by their economic costs. Despite being self-interested, equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons, for example, out of fairness considerations or in order to facilitate negotiations. Consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions, we find that individuals are more likely to state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate their own region or regions that support the individual's personally preferred equity rule. Negotiators perceive the use of equity by regions as less influenced by pressure from interest groups.
Keywords: equity; climate negotiations; self-interest; international policy
JEL Codes: D63; H41; Q54
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| economic costs (D61) | perceived support for equity rules (D63) |
| perceived support for equity rules (D63) | economic costs (D61) |
| self-interest (F52) | use of equity arguments (D63) |
| personal preferences (D11) | perception of equity arguments (D63) |
| perceived incorporation of equity principles (G38) | material self-interest (D01) |
| use of equity arguments (D63) | negotiating positions (C78) |
| interest groups (D72) | use of equity arguments (D63) |