Working Paper: NBER ID: w14799
Authors: James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik
Abstract: A key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached - swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political parties can use repression and violence to exclude voters from elections, they may optimally target the swing voters. This is because they anticipate that if they had to compete for the support of these voters, they would end up giving them a lot of policy favors. Hence in weakly institutionalized political environments swing voters are cursed rather than blessed. We illustrate the analysis with a discussion of recent political events in Zimbabwe.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political competition (D72) | disenfranchisement of swing voters (D72) |
| Anticipation of swing voters extracting rents (D72) | disenfranchisement of swing voters (D72) |
| Use of violence (D74) | targeting of swing voters (K16) |
| Disenfranchisement of swing voters (D72) | increased political rents for incumbents (D72) |
| Ideological commitment of voters (D72) | targeting of swing voters (K16) |
| Political competition (D72) | use of violence in electoral contexts (K16) |