Working Paper: NBER ID: w14769
Authors: Philippe Aghion; John Van Reenen; Luigi Zingales
Abstract: We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
Keywords: institutional ownership; innovation; managerial incentives; corporate governance
JEL Codes: G20; G32; O31; O32; O33
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Institutional Ownership (G32) | Managerial Incentives to Innovate (O31) |
| Managerial Incentives to Innovate (O31) | Innovation (O35) |
| Institutional Ownership (G32) | Reduced Career Risks for CEOs (M12) |
| Reduced Career Risks for CEOs (M12) | Innovation (O35) |
| Institutional Ownership (G32) | Innovation (O35) |
| Being Added to S&P 500 (G24) | Institutional Ownership (G32) |