Working Paper: NBER ID: w14703
Authors: Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Keywords: disclosure; politicians; corruption; accountability
JEL Codes: H11; K42; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public disclosure of politicians' financial information (G38) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| disclosure identifying sources of income and conflicts of interest (G38) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| mere disclosure of values of income or assets (D14) | perceived corruption (H57) |
| public access to disclosures (G38) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| effectiveness of disclosure (G38) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| public disclosure in democratic contexts (D72) | lower perceived corruption (H57) |
| corrupt practices (H57) | nature of disclosure laws (G38) |