Median Stable Matching

Working Paper: NBER ID: w14689

Authors: Michael Schwarz; M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract: We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it exists.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: C78; J01


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
median stable matching exists (C78)median stable matching is influenced by the distribution of utilities among agents (C78)
median stable matching acts as a compromise solution (C78)median stable matching exists (C78)
median stable matching affected by underlying distributions of utilities in extreme matchings (C78)median utility levels for agents are average of utility levels in firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable matchings (C78)
discrete core converges to continuous core (D51)nature of the matching changes as conditions of the market evolve (C78)

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