Working Paper: NBER ID: w14606
Authors: Eli Berman; Jacob N. Shapiro; Joseph H. Felter
Abstract: We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007.
Keywords: counterinsurgency; Iraq; reconstruction; violence; service provision
JEL Codes: F51; F52; H4; H43; H56; O12; O53
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased service provision, particularly through smaller projects funded by CERP (O22) | Reduction in insurgent violence (D74) |
| Community characteristics (sectarian status and socioeconomic grievances) (Z12) | Moderating impact on spending's effect on violence (H56) |
| CERP spending (H76) | Reduction in insurgent violence (D74) |
| Local public goods provision (H41) | Decreased violence levels (D74) |