Working Paper: NBER ID: w14298
Authors: Noel Maurer; Lakshmi Iyer
Abstract: We examine three reforms to property rights introduced by the United States in the Philippines in the early 20th century: the redistribution of large estates to their tenants, the creation of a system of secure land titles, and a homestead program to encourage cultivation of public lands. During the first phase of American occupation (1898-1918), we find that the progress of implementing these reforms was very slow. As a consequence, tenure insecurity increased over this period, and the distribution of farm sizes remained extremely unequal. We identify two primary causes for the slow progress of reform: first, the high cost of implementing these programs was a major factor in reducing take-up. On the other hand, the government was reluctant to evict delinquent or informal cultivators, especially on public lands. This reduced the costs of tenure insecurity. Political constraints prevented the government from subsidizing land reforms to a greater degree.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: N45; N55; P14; P16; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| high costs associated with implementing property rights reforms (P14) | hindered adoption and execution of reforms (D73) |
| high costs of reform (P22) | high delinquency rates on payments (G33) |
| government's reluctance to evict informal cultivators (O17) | increased tenure insecurity (J63) |
| absence of enforcement against squatters (P14) | rise in informal landholding (O17) |
| lack of secure property rights (P14) | did not deter agricultural development in the short term (O13) |