Working Paper: NBER ID: w13999
Authors: Pedro Dal B; Andrew Foster; Louis Putterman
Abstract: A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions.
Keywords: democracy; cooperation; experimental evidence; institutions
JEL Codes: C10; C9; D7; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Democratic institutions (D02) | Cooperative behavior (C71) |
| Endogenous policy choice (D78) | Cooperative behavior (C71) |
| Exogenous policy choice (D78) | Cooperative behavior (C71) |
| Democratic institutions (D02) | Endogenous treatment effect (C22) |
| Endogenous treatment effect (C22) | Cooperative behavior (C71) |
| Selection effect (C24) | Cooperative behavior (C71) |