Working Paper: NBER ID: w13964
Authors: Sylvain Chassang; Gerard Padro i Miquel
Abstract: We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to define and distinguish predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of conflict. We show that while weapons have an unambiguous deterrent effect under complete information, this does not hold anymore under strategic risk. Rather, we find that increases in weapon stocks can have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of peace. We also show that under strategic risk, inequality in military strength can ac- tually facilitate peace and that anticipated peace-keeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
Keywords: deterrence; strategic risk; conflict; peacekeeping; military strength
JEL Codes: C72; C73; D74
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increase in weapon stocks (H56) | Clear deterrent effect (K49) |
| Increase in weapon stocks (H56) | Raises costs of conflict (predatory motive) (D74) |
| Strategic risk (D80) | Non-monotonic relationship between weapons and peace sustainability (D74) |
| Very destructive weapons (Y50) | Tend to deter conflict (D74) |
| Intermediate weapons (L64) | May destabilize peace by increasing preemptive strike incentives (D74) |
| Inequalities in military strength (H56) | Increase predatory motives for the stronger party (L21) |
| Inequalities in military strength (H56) | Reduce preemptive motives for both parties (D74) |
| Delayed peacekeeping interventions (F51) | Can be beneficial by reducing need for preemptive strikes (H56) |
| Strategic risk (D80) | Alters conventional understanding of deterrence and intervention (D74) |