Working Paper: NBER ID: w13852
Authors: Lee Alston; Shannan Mattiace; Tomas Nonnenmacher
Abstract: While most contemporary historians agree that the use of debt peonage as a coercive labor contract in Mexico was not widespread, scholars still concur that it was important and pervasive in Yucatan state during the henequen boom of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The henequen boom concurred with the long rule of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910), under whose watch property rights were reallocated through land laws, and Mexico's economy became much more closely tied to the United States. In the Yucatan, the accumulation of debts by peons rose as hacendados sought to attract and bond workers to match the rising U.S. demand for twine. We examine the institutional setting in which debt operated and analyze the specific functions of debt: who got it, what form it took, and why it varied across workers. We stress the formal and informal institutional contexts within which hacendados and workers negotiated contracts.
Keywords: debt peonage; henequen industry; Yucatan; labor contracts; economic history
JEL Codes: J33; N16; N36; N56; O54; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Institutional setting during the henequen boom (P13) | Workers made choices and responded to incentives (J29) |
| Less coercive environment (I29) | Shifted bargaining power in favor of workers (J52) |
| Cultural and social norms (Z13) | Specific form of debt (F34) |
| Cultural and social norms (Z13) | Increased demand for debt among workers (J29) |
| Debt (H63) | Mechanism of paternalism (D64) |
| Debt (H63) | Compensated workers on multiple margins (J31) |
| Debt (H63) | Fostered loyalty to hacendados (N96) |
| Loans for weddings and community events (G51) | Tied workers to the hacienda (J82) |
| Tied workers to the hacienda (J82) | Created a reciprocal relationship that benefited both parties (L14) |