Working Paper: NBER ID: w13766
Authors: Michael Ostrovsky; Michael Schwarz
Abstract: This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.
Keywords: information disclosure; matching markets; unraveling; transcripts; labor market
JEL Codes: D82; D83; I21; J01
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| disclosure of benchmark amount of information (Y10) | prevents early contracting (D86) |
| disclosure of benchmark amount of information (Y10) | inhibits unraveling (Y60) |
| disclosure of more than benchmark amount of information (G14) | incentivizes early contracting (D86) |
| disclosure of more than benchmark amount of information (G14) | leads to unraveling (Y50) |
| prevents early contracting (D86) | increases expected position desirability tomorrow over today (D84) |