Working Paper: NBER ID: w13757
Authors: Gary Richardson; Dan Bogart
Abstract: Adaptable property-rights institutions, we argue, foster economic development. The British example illustrates this point. Around 1700, Parliament established a forum where rights to land and resources could be reorganized. This venue enabled landholders and communities to take advantage of economic opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited from the past. In this essay, historical evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis demonstrate that Parliament increased the number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to increases in the public's demand for such acts. This evidence corroborates a cornerstone of our hypothesis.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H1; K0; K1; N0; N43; P1; P10; P14; P16; P20; P26; P48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Economic conditions (E66) | Number of acts passed (D72) |
| Public demand for acts (R22) | Number of acts passed (D72) |
| Real interest rate (E43) | Number of acts passed (D72) |
| Economic booms (E32) | Number of acts passed (D72) |
| Parliamentary accommodation of public demand (D72) | Number of acts passed (D72) |